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Abstract
Ever since the introduction of the EU’s four freedoms, EU citizens have been prom-
ised the freedom to move freely within the confines of the EU. As the EU’s population 
expanded through enlargement, in conjunction with growing pressure on labor market, 
wages and employment, European public attitudes toward immigration seem to become 
more polarized. Thus, immigration, especially that of the admittance of non-EU third-
country nationals, may be rendered as a highly contested issue within Europe’s two-level 
systems. However, what is happening inside the EU, in terms of intra-EU immigration, is 
rarely considered within such contestation. This paper plans to address this issue by using a 
historical institutionalist approach in analyzing scholarly claims regarding the securitization 
of immigration vis-à-vis the development of EU immigration policies and approaches, as 
well as the role that citizenship plays on immigration. This way, a fuller understanding of 
Europe’s overall unfavorable attitude toward immigration could be achieved.
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The creation of the EU’s four freedoms and the Schengen Area has allowed both EU 
citizens and third-country nationals (TCNs) to travel with very little restriction. However, 
it looks as though Europe is experiencing a backlash against immigration, especially in the 
case of external immigration. A central aspect of this backlash is the concept of TCNs. In 
EU parlance, TCNs refer to individuals who are nationals and citizens of non-EU member 
states (Eurofound, 2007). However, in immigration studies, TCNs are equal to the concept 
of alien—defined as “a person who is not a national of a given State”—and foreigner—de-
fined as “a person belonging to, or owing an allegiance to, another State” (International 
Organization for Migration, 2004, pp. 4, 25). Therefore, TCNs could encompass not only 
non-EU citizens (non-EU TCNs), but also EU citizens who live or reside in another EU 
member state (EU TCNs). Even so, headlines surrounding the backlash against immigration 
seem to only target non-EU TCNs, regardless of the fact that non-EU TCNs are the largest 
group of people who exercised the freedom to move inside the EU (Benton & Petrovic, 
2013). To better understand this backlash, a closer analysis of EU immigration policies and 
approaches needs to take place. This paper intends to do just that and aims to answer the 
question of what might explain the backlash against immigration in Europe by first review-
ing existing scholarly EU research on immigration and citizenship. Afterward, a historical 
institutionalist analysis of claims derived from the literature review vis-à-vis the develop-
ment of EU immigration policies and approaches, as well as Europe’s competing notions of 
citizenship will be carried out.
Literature Review
Europe today can be categorized in two interconnected groups: the EU and the na-
tional level (i.e. the now 28 EU member states). The dynamics between these groups can 
be understood by Putnam’s two-level games theory (1988) and the concept of Europeaniza-
tion. Putnam’s theory views international negotiations between states as encompassing of 
negotiations at the national level between domestic groups and their respective state govern-
ment, as well as the international level among different state governments. Outcomes in the 
latter depend on the intersection and overlap of the win-sets, which Putnam defines as the 
array of possible international level agreements in domestic negotiations of various states in 
the national level (1988, p. 439). A related theory in EU studies regarding negotiations on 
immigration politics is the concept Europeanization, which Bulmer and Radaelli (2004, p. 
4) describes as “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared 
beliefs and norms.”
Immigration literatures within the two aforementioned frameworks vary in content, 
but most of them deal with individual case studies and, most importantly, the notion that 
bottom-up Europeanization equals to the securitization of immigration. Geddes (2003) dis-
tinguishes four periods of immigration policy integration: the period of minimal immigra-
tion policy involvement from 1957 to 1986, the period of informal intergovernmentalism 
from 1986 to 1993, the period of formal intergovernmental cooperation from 1993 to 1999, 
and the period of communitarization from the late 1990s and onward. These four periods 
saw the uploading of immigration policies from the national level to the informal, outside-
of-the-EU level (e.g. the Trevi group), and upwards to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
and acquis communautire level of the EU. However, as Boswell (2003) notes, the uploading 
of immigration competence from the national to the EU level furthers the securitization of 
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immigration in the form of externalized immigration control, in which migrant-sending and 
transit states work with the EU in strengthening border controls as a result of the increase 
in illegal immigration to EU territories and the lack of sufficient instrument in the national 
level to combat such type of immigration. Geddes (2005, p. 802) supports and extends this 
claim by describing that EU policies focus more on the fortification of territorial borders 
in response to the “geo-political and conceptual widenings of migration” of post-cold war 
Europe.
The securitization of immigration is a key theme in EU immigration scholarship. 
Huysmans (2000) argues that the issue stems from the fear that immigration threatens the 
inner, cultural, and welfare security of EU member states. In this light, integration and 
inclusion of non-EU TCNs of whichever type in the EU become a more complex issue. 
However, the contemporary notion of securitization of immigration could also be explained 
by Europe’s low external threat level. Rudolph (2006) asserts that in times where external 
threat is felt, states would rally and take in more non-EU TCN migrants—as illustrated in 
post-WWII Germany’s admission of predominantly Turkish guest workers and France’s 
admission of predominantly North African workers for the purpose of rebuilding their re-
spective economy and population growth, as well as facing against Communist threats. As 
threats subside, immigration becomes contested and, therefore, securitized. Givens (2010) 
furthers this notion by stating how issues concerning border control, visas, and asylum have 
relatively been salient and agreeable upon in the EU level, whilst EU level integration poli-
cies are much more contested, since the latter touches upon the internal fears, as outlined 
by Huysmans (2000), that states have toward immigration. On top of that, recent critical 
junctures like 9/11 are noted in creating path dependency by reaffirming and realizing the 
embedded notion of immigration as a security threat (Brouwer, 2003; Karyotis, 2007)—
which is evident in the post-9/11 restrictive policy outcomes of the EU (Bendel, 2005) and 
the EU’s Hague Programme’s equation of freedom and justice as equal to strengthening 
security (Bigo, 2005).
Looking outside of the realm of security, there exists an abundance of specific Euro-
peanization literature that uses an institutionalist view on the issue of the transfer and devel-
opment of immigration competence. Literatures using such view are evident in Faist’s and 
Ette’s (2007) article compilation, featuring comprehensive empirical assessment of Europe-
anization cases that wholly argue that top-down impact of EU immigration competence, 
as well as European integration in general, have changed the scope of immigration policies 
and the political dynamics of immigration policy-making in the national level. As a result 
of this path dependent European integration, harmonization of certain immigration policies 
in the EU level has become contested. Givens and Luedtke (2004) note that harmonization 
motions in highly salient areas, such as provisions regarding non-EU TCN movement and 
asylum, would unlikely result in success, opting more toward exclusively restrictive har-
monization. However, motions in low salient areas, such as intra-EU border controls and 
anti-discrimination, would more likely result in a rather expansive harmonization support. 
Toshkov and De Haan (2013) further note that the EU’s salient policy area of asylum has 
had limited impact in national asylum policy outcomes. This is noted to happen as a result 
of the unequal allocation of asylum recognitions and applications in each member states. 
However, when the institutionalist view is looked on from the eyes of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), Slot and Bulterman (2005) note that there seems to be a convergence hap-
pening within the rules and regulations for EU TCNs, and certain non-EU TCNs, regard-
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ing the right of movement and residence.
Convergence and harmonization account as two salient themes within the institution-
alist immigration literature. Further institutionalist literature on path dependence—which 
contends that distinctive historical sequences of prior actions shape the current landscape of, 
for instance, policy regulations toward non-EU TCNs—might shed a light on why these 
two exact themes are covered. Boswell (2005) notes that external critical junctures, such 
as the ones regarded by scholars who write on the securitization of immigration, are not 
the only ones that have created and shaped immigration policy outcomes or individual at-
titudes toward non-EU TCNs. Instead, Boswell notes that path dependent changes inside 
the EU should also be considered. Herz (2006) notes that intergovernmental policy-making 
that involves unanimity—the modus operandi of the pre-formalized ad hoc immigration 
groups—has influenced not only immigration policy outcomes, particularly with regard 
to asylum, but also put in place an intergovernmental dynamics in the JHA—even when 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was introduced in 2004. Herz further argues that this 
happens because working groups preparing the work of the JHA still hold an intergovern-
mental characteristic. However, Herz also notes that intergovernmental cooperation rarely 
exists in issues of regular immigration, which might explain the failures in trying to achieve 
certain EU immigration policy outcomes. Furthermore, Boswell (2007) emphasizes the 
need to look at internal, or rather institutional path dependency of the EU in order to bet-
ter comprehend the current immigration circumstances in Europe. Boswell illustrates this 
by claiming that 9/11 did not lead to the securitization of immigration, since securitization 
would increase pressure on reducing immigration and would be contradictory to the im-
migration system that has already been put to place by the EU and its member states.
Turning back to the issue regarding the convergence of rules and regulations for cer-
tain non-EU and EU TCNs, Slot and Bulterman (2005) explains that the main driving force 
of such convergence is the ECJ’s interpretation of the provisions on citizenship in Articles 
18 and 12 of the EC Treaty. The notion of citizenship is a complex one, for it, according 
to Cover, “attempts to encompass in one word a legal status, a state of mind, a civic obli-
gation, an immigration benefit, an international legal marking, and a personal virtue” (as 
cited in Faist, 2000a, p. 5). Therefore, both internal and external movements of non-EU 
and EU TCNs in European territories might pose a challenge to this notion of citizenship. 
In EU immigration and citizenship studies, citizenship has been described as “postnational” 
(Soysal, 1994; Tambini, 2001) and “transnational” (Baübock, 2003), meaning that there is 
“a shift in the major organizing principle of membership in contemporary polities: the logic 
of personhood supersedes the logic of national citizenship” (Soysal, 1994, p. 164). These 
descriptions posit that there exists a receding significance of interstate boundaries and that 
exclusive rights to nationals of a particular state are no longer exclusive. Such rights are now 
available to any residents of that state regardless of the resident’s status. In this sense, the 
notion of citizenship has become, or rather on its way to become denationalized (Bosniak, 
2000; Sassen, 2003). Even if this was true, scholars like Faist (2000b) have questioned the 
denationalization of citizenship claim. Faist states that although there are evidences of rights 
expansion vis-à-vis Europeanization found in multiple studies surrounding the denational-
ization of citizenship, those evidences are only representative.
Furthermore, citizenship in Europe has been called “nested,” which Faist (2000a, 
2001) describes as holding multiple citizenships and participating fully in both the EU and 
national level. Faist posits that in light of this concept, certain individual rights have not only 
Robertus Anders American University
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/4
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 2 7
been enlarged, but they have also been Europeanized and, to an extent, institutionalized so 
that a right enjoyed in one EU member state can be enjoyed in another EU member state. 
Jacobson and Ruffer (2003) further this view by claiming that there exists a development 
in the importance of EU and national level judicial agencies on the expansion of migrant 
rights. A critical principle of this claim is the role of the “nesting effect,” which means that 
“people will go to a higher nested organization to appeal, judicially, for recourse; but only 
so far as they have to go (for example, the province is preferred over the state; or the state 
over a regional organization)” (Jacobson & Ruffer, 2003, p. 86). Therefore, as the highest 
court in the land, the ECJ has arguably the utmost authority and power in Europe when 
citizenship is viewed as that of a Matryoshka doll, in which national citizenship is nested 
within a larger doll that is EU citizenship. 
The expansion of citizenship rights to non-EU and EU TCNs through the ECJ can be 
seen as a key salient theme in EU immigration and citizenship scholarship. On the legal side, 
Wiesbrock (2012) highlights that as of current, the type of rights that non-EU TCNs can 
legally enjoy is dependent on which migrant category does that TCN fall under, since the 
EU could not grant full extension of EU citizenship status to non-EU TCNs. Maas (2008) 
further notes that although there have been certain widening and deepening of rights for 
EU TCNs, there exists a difficulty in passing certain non-EU TCN rights legislations as a 
result of the continuing contestations with regard to the importance of borders and national 
citizenship. However, Wiesbrock (2012) argues that there is room in the ECJ for identical 
interpretation of EU rights to non-EU and EU TCNs, which would not only subscribe to 
the objectives of the Tampere and Stockholm Programmes, but also be a feasible alternative 
to the full extension of EU citizenship.
Aside from issues surrounding citizenship and rights, the conceptualization of citizen-
ship status is also worth noting. Unlike the proponents of postnational, transnational, and 
nested citizenship, Hansen (2009) argues that national citizenship takes precedence over 
EU citizenship. Therefore, membership of citizenship in Europe is not only governed by 
each individual member state, but it is also viewed as reinforcing, rather than superseding, 
national citizenship. This view then reaffirms the aforementioned discussion that the status 
of “EU citizen” and the benefits that come with that status can only be given to those who 
are nationals of EU member states, which includes EU TCNs, not non-EU TCNs. The 
reinforcement of national citizenship is evident in literatures on the growing importance 
and implementation of civic integration, wherein states require non-EU TCNs to under-
take courses, tests, interview, etc. to assess, inter alia, particular language skills and coun-
try knowledge for purposes of naturalization and settlement (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009; 
Goodman, 2012; Joppke, 2007a, 2012). In light of this, immigration is then treated not so 
much as a security issue, rather an identity issue of whether or not non-EU TCNs could in-
tegrate into their respective host countries. Therefore, it looks as though there exists a clash 
between the discourse on citizenship and the securitization of immigration regarding the 
treatment and mobility of non-EU TCNs. At the same time, there seems to be a disconnec-
tion between that particular clash and the institutionalist theme of convergence and harmo-
nization that are happening in the EU level. Ameliorating this disconnection is, therefore, 
an imperative in order to understand the current negative EU immigration circumstances.
Analysis
The new institutionalist frame of approaches provides an important lens to analyze 
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how the EU works in terms of its policies and approaches to immigration. As has been 
discussed in the literature review, it is apparent that this particular framework is an effective 
tool to analyze the broad modus operandi of an institution such as that of the EU, for it 
encompasses a “disparate set of ideas with diverse disciplinary origins, analytic assumptions, 
and explanatory claims” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999, p. 431). To better explain about the 
tenets of new institutionalism, Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) note that the framework 
can be broken down into three approaches: sociological, historical, and rational choice in-
stitutionalism. In their own way, these approaches aim to explain the process of uploading 
and downloading certain policies or competences. However, they also aim to describe why 
actors behave as they behave and how, as Radaelli (2000) notes, institutional “rules, shared 
interpretations, symbols, schemata and meanings” (p. 38) influence actors’ choices, making 
them bias agents who could potentially structure actions and outcomes in both the EU and 
national level (March & Olsen, 1984). However, explicit differences between these three 
approaches and the logic behind them do exist.
According to Harmsen (2000), sociological institutionalism focuses on not only how 
culture, domestic institutions, and certain path dependent preferences endogenously form 
an actor’s decision-making process, but also how socialization affects an actor’s preference 
and choice. On a similar note, historical institutionalism focuses more on the role of the 
past, particularly on how previous policy decisions and approaches play a role in shaping the 
path that current policies and approaches take. Conversely, rational choice institutionalism 
regards political actors as strategic agents of their respective country’s national interest. Both 
sociological and historical institutionalisms are often coupled together as a result of their 
complementary frameworks and quantitative nature, whilst rational choice institutionalism 
is a case of its own as result of its qualitative nature (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). For the 
purpose of this paper, taking on a historical institutionalist approach seems to be the best fit, 
since, for the most part, scholarly claims regarding the securitization of immigration, as well 
as the conceptualization of citizenship in Europe touch on the development of certain EU 
policies and approaches over time. Therefore, to clearly analyze and link these claims and 
concepts so as to gain a fuller understanding of Europe’s overall unfavorable attitude toward 
immigration would require an approach that takes into account the role of the past.
The EU’s original form, as well as its development over time can clearly be distin-
guished when it is analyzed in a historical institutionalist approach. As was mentioned, 
Geddes (2003) illustrates that the Europeanization of immigration competence can be cat-
egorized in four periods: the period of minimal immigration policy involvement from 1957 
to 1986, the period of informal intergovernmentalism from 1986 to 1993, the period of 
formal intergovernmental cooperation from 1993 to 1999, and the period of communitar-
ization from the late 1990s and onward (p. 131). To understand what kind of policies and 
approaches came up within these periods is imperative in order to understand not only why 
there exists contestations with regard to immigration in today’s Europe, but also what steps 
the EU has taken and is currently taking in the facilitation of immigration in and to the 
borders of the EU.
Geddes (2007) notes that the EU’s first and foremost objective centers around eco-
nomics, which can be illustrated by the creation of the single market via the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty (Maastricht), as well as the formulation of the Economic and Monetary Union (p. 
51). The free movement of persons was one of four freedoms— the other three being the 
free movement of goods, services, and capital—that were created as a result of this exclu-
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sively economic integration. The term “persons,” here, should be questioned when non-
EU TCNs are taken into consideration, in relation to the Europeanization of immigration 
competence over the course of EU history. Looking back at the period of minimal im-
migration policy involvement, it is evident that TCN-related issues were dealt with more 
in an intergovernmental setting, as illustrated in the function of the TREVI group—an 
intergovernmental, outside-of-the-EU group that was set up to respond to terrorism and 
coordinate policing of the EU (Bunyan, 1993, p. 1)—and the 1985 Schengen Agreement—
a treaty on the removal of internal borders, which was later supplemented by the Schengen 
Convention in 1995.
Initial uploads of immigration and asylum competence could be seen in the Maastricht 
Treaty, wherein it institutionalized the ad hoc intergovernmental setting on immigration 
in Europe in the form of the JHA—the EU’s third pillar, under Title VI of Maastricht 
(Monar, 2012). This was a huge step in the EU, since there were no explicit mentions of 
a harmonized immigration and asylum agenda in the original Treaty of Rome. However, 
the first mention of such subject can be traced back to the 1975 Tindemans Report, yet 
the issue itself became subordinated when the matter of internal border controls took much 
greater precedence in the EU (Niemann, 2006, p. 12). Even so, the 1990s was a different 
period of time in Europe. Immigration became a concern more than ever as a result of the 
high influx of immigration, especially that of illegal immigrants (Boswell, 2003). A major 
aspect of Maastricht was the establishment of TCN-related issues of “common interests” 
that includes asylum policy, external borders crossing, general immigration non-EU TCNs 
policies, non-EU TCN entry and movement conditions on member state grounds, non-EU 
TCN residence conditions on member states grounds (which includes family reunion and 
employment access), and combating illegal TCN immigration, residence, and work (Ged-
des, 2003, 135). It should be noted, however, that the ECJ at this time was excluded from 
the affairs of JHA under Article L of Maastricht; there was, however, one exception to this, 
which was Article 100c on visa policies (Edward, 1995; Monar, 2012, p. 722). The real in-
novation in Maastricht, however, was the introduction of EU citizenship under Maastricht’s 
Articles 8-8e, which will be further discussed in later paragraphs.
The issue of immigration was further formalized in the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty (Am-
sterdam). There, Monar (2001) notes that certain immigration issues under the auspice of 
the JHA were communautarized to the first pillar under Title IV of Amsterdam that governs 
“visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons,” 
which consequently created an area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ). Not only 
that, but Amsterdam also gave the ECJ mandate in those former-JHA areas, which meant 
that the ECJ could take and rule in cases under Amsterdam’s Title IV, only if requested by 
national member states’ courts. QMV was also introduced as a new voting mechanism in 
order to streamline the problematic unanimity-requirement of intergovernmental proce-
dure (Monar, 2001). In a lot of ways, however, the expansion of EU competence in areas of 
immigration and asylum happened more after Amsterdam—specifically pointing to the pro-
visions of the 1999 Tampere Programme (Tampere). Tampere outlined the basic features 
of an EU common immigration and asylum policy, including partnering with countries of 
origin, creating a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), treating non-EU TCNs in 
a fair manner, and managing immigration flows (European Council, 1999). Not only that, 
but Tampere also noted that long-term resident non-EU TCNs “should be granted in that 
Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU 
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citizens”—a key essential when considering Europe’s competing notions of citizenship (Eu-
ropean Council, 1999).
Geddes (2007) characterizes the significance of Amsterdam and Tampere as “the legal 
basis and a political direction” (p. 52) for issues of immigration and asylum in the EU level. 
However, literature on the securitization of immigration contends that immigration and 
asylum in a post-cold war Europe are considered as security challenges, which scholars in-
terpret as constructing Fortress Europe (Bendel, 2005; Boswell, 2003; Geddes, 2005; Huys-
mans, 2000). However, this may not be the case since an inward-looking Fortress Europe 
would mean restricting and fortifying EU’s borders so as to decrease the susceptibility of 
those so-called security challenges. Instead, external and institutional path dependent junc-
tures that the EU has experienced throughout its development needs to be taken into ac-
count. For instance, proponents of the securitization of immigration often point to the EU’s 
restrictive asylum regulation, the Dublin II Agreement (Dublin II), as justification for the 
construction of Fortress Europe (Guiraudon, 2000; Levy, 2005). However, historical insti-
tutionalism illustrates that the restrictive content of Dublin II was not something new, since 
its predecessor, the 1990 Dublin Convention, had the same provision that acknowledges the 
member state of first entry as the one responsible for processing asylum applications (Hur-
witz, 1999). What Dublin II did in 2003 was that it not only reinforced the already existing 
tenets of its predecessor, but also furthered them by creating EURODAC—a database of 
fingerprints for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. In fact, these restrictive measures led 
Dublin II to be criticized for its unfair burden sharing practice, since it imposed “untenable 
pressure on those states situated along Europe’s borders: ‘gateway’ countries such as Poland, 
Spain, Italy and Greece” (Arimatsu & Samson, 2011, p. 8). In response to this, the Dublin 
III Agreement (Dublin III) was created in 2013, which, like its predecessors, still placed 
responsibility to process asylum applications to the member state of first entry. What Dublin 
III did, however, was that it changed its regulation to provide better safeguards for asylum 
seekers, including a suspensive right of appeal, the prohibition for states to transfer an asylum 
seeker to another member state, an early warning mechanism to monitor member states’ 
implementation of asylum laws, an emphasis on respect for family life (which is extended for 
unaccompanied minors), a right to personal interview, and a common leaflet on the Dublin 
and EURODAC process (European Union, 2013).
Not only does the literature on the securitization of immigration often points fingers 
at the EU’s restrictive asylum regulation, but it also often points fingers at the JHA’s border 
control agencies, specifically Frontières extérieures, or FRONTEX, as it is often called 
(Chillaud, 2012; Léonard, 2009, 2010; Papastavridis, 2010). Created in 2005, FRONTEX 
is a Warsaw-based independent EU agency that works on the coordination of operational 
cooperation between EU member states to strengthen, as well as manage, the EU’s external 
border and was thought to be a response to 9/11 (Boswell, 2007; Neal, 2009). However, 
as Neal (2009) notes, a closer analysis shows that FRONTEX was created not a result of 
this particular critical juncture, nor was it a result of securitization. Neal (2009) comments 
that FRONTEX was, in fact, created to respond to “the disintegration of a common EU 
response to migration, security and borders,” with the terms “security” and “urgency” 
were all but missing within the discourse of the establishment of FRONTEX (p. 346). 
 Not only that, but when analyzed in a historical institutionalist approach, it is ap-
parent that the creation of FRONTEX can be traced way back to the establishment of 
Schengen Area. The 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1995 Schengen Convention were 
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aimed at removing internal border controls of the EU so as to be in line with the EU’s 
four freedoms—especially the free movement of people—that was formulized under the 
EU’s economic core of establishing a single market. It should be noted, however, that all 
four freedoms—the free movement of people, goods, services, and capitals—were created 
exclusively for EU nationals, including EU TCNs, but not non-EU TCNs (Barnard, 2013). 
Even before Schengen was communautarized into the acquis communautaire, Schengen af-
fected the EU greatly as it not only removed internal border controls, but also developed a 
strong external border aspect, including the provision of common visas to non-EU TCNs. 
Building on this, Tampere and its successor, the 2004 Hague Programme (Hague), also 
emphasized the need to regulate and manage EU’s external border, which then pressurized 
the European Council to strengthen not only external, but also physical border control by 
establishing a European external borders agency: FRONTEX (Council of the European 
Union, 2004).
As was mentioned, Tampere was a particularly important programme for it outlined 
the EU’s common immigration and asylum policy. Scholars who write on the securitization 
of immigration often view Tampere as a shift away from focusing on economic immigra-
tion—a focus that lined up well with the EU’s economic core—to focusing on asylum and 
security, even though there was a proposed policy plan on legal immigration in 2005 that 
was supposed to follow up on a 2004 Commission Green Paper on economic immigration 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004). However, when Hague is taken into 
account, it seems as though there was a U-turn in the discourse on immigration, wherein 
economic immigration takes precedence over other forms of immigration. Hague states that 
“legal migration will play an important role in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in 
Europe, in advancing economic development, and thus contributing to the implementation 
of the Lisbon strategy” (Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 19).
A choice of focusing back to economic immigration was easier said than done. Accord-
ing to Luedtke (2011), the European Council passed three successful highly salient Direc-
tives on legal non-EU TCN issues after Hague—family reunification, long-term residents, 
and the Visa Information System—and two successful low salient ones—the admission of 
students and researchers. However, Luedtke mentions that there was only one highly salient 
Directive that proved unsuccessful, which was the one on economic migrants. Although 
these outcomes were not in line with what Hague had envisioned, it should be noted that 
2004 was not a conducive year in Europe. Bendel (2007) notes that ramifications of 9/11 
and the 2004 Madrid train bombings greatly contributed to the shift in the EU’s approach 
to immigration, focusing less on economic immigration and more on security and control 
(p. 36). Path dependency requires a focus on not only what is going on internally, but also 
what is going on externally. Therefore, when the time is right, the issue of economic im-
migration could then take precedence. An illustration of this can be seen in the year 2009. 
The year 2009 can be argued as the right time for the issue of economic immigration to take 
precedence, which can be illustrated by the successful admission of Blue Card Programme 
for highly-skilled economic migrants by the European Council. In fact, Luedtke (2011) 
mentions that in that year, EU member states were influenced by what Spain did with its 
problem with illegal immigration, in which a de facto labor immigration policy was placed 
through regularizing Spain’s low-skilled labor—meaning that the workers could then gain 
certain EU rights under the Long-term Residents Directive (p. 15-16).
The Stockholm Programme (Stockholm) was the next incarnation of Hague and Tam-
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pere. To view Stockholm in a historical institutionalist manner, it is imperative to look more 
into the main provisions of the European Commission’s Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM). As the implementation provision of Stockholm, GAMM prioritizes 
four main components, which included “improving the organisation of legal migration and 
facilitated mobility, preventing and reducing irregular migration in an efficient, yet humane 
way, strengthening the synergies between migration and development, strengthening in-
ternational protection systems and the external dimension of asylum” (European Commis-
sion, 2014b). Taking into account the wording and the focus of these four priorities, it is 
clear that those priorities constitute as evidence of the EU’s institutional path dependency, 
since their policy aims and approaches are not only similar to that of their predecessors, but 
also could be linked to past decisions and developments of, inter alia, the removal internal 
borders of Schengen, the strengthening external border management, and the creation of a 
coherent CEAS.
Taking into consideration the historical institutionalist analysis of the development of 
immigration policies and approaches in the EU level that has been presented so far, it looks 
as though the claim on how the securitization of immigration via the Europeanization of 
EU competence has constructed Europe’s Fortress Europe attitude toward immigration 
might just be inaccurate. With regard to the contention on restrictive immigration policies, 
taking on a historical institutionalist analysis has shown that EU level policies have only 
actively participated in the area of immigration control and border control, which Givens 
(2010) characterizes as “a crucial component of not only migration flows but also national 
security” (p. 82). Generally, issues surrounding border control, visas, and asylum are the 
ones that prove to be salient in the EU level. On top of that, external border agencies like 
FRONTEX and the Visa Information System have, as Guild notes, represented a “hard-
ening of the tools of control” (as cited in Neal, 2009). Even so, this does not mean that a 
Fortress Europe is being constructed, at least not in the supranational level.
To gain a fuller understanding of Europe’s overall unfavorable attitude toward immi-
gration, a look into the judicial branch of the EU, the ECJ, needs to be taken. Currently, 
there exists a difference between scholarly and legal literatures surrounding the roles that 
non-EU and EU TCNs have in the EU immigration discourse. In scholarly literatures, only 
non-EU TCNs are often mentioned when discussing immigration, but both non-EU and 
EU TCNs are mentioned in legal literatures on immigration. As has been discussed in the 
literature review, the role of law and the ECJ are becoming much more contested as they 
touch upon issues of identity. For instance, Cornelissen (2013) notes that the ECJ has not 
only been criticized for overprotecting non-EU TCNs vis-à-vis the ECJ’s interpretation of 
EU Regulations on the coordination of social security system, but at the same time, the ECJ 
has also been criticized for its interpretation of special non-contributory benefits—which 
supports the view that non-EU TCNs have to demonstrate a certain degree of integration in 
the host state before they could claim any particular benefits. Nevertheless, legal literatures 
that have analyzed decisions made by the ECJ over time confirm that there exist an expan-
sion of rights that TCNs could claim, which mainly touched upon the principle of non-
discrimination under the provisions and notions of citizenship in Europe (Kochenov, 2009, 
2011; Kochenov & Plender, 2012; Peh, 2013; Slot & Bulterman, 2005; Wiesbrock, 2012). 
Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011) further note that recent decisions made by the ECJ 
show that the gap between EU citizens’ rights and non-EU TCNs’ rights has lessened as a 
result of the ECJ’s similar interpretation of certain non-EU TCN provisions to case laws rel-
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evant to EU citizens, as well as the use of the Charter of Fundamental Rights—such as that 
of the 2010 Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken case. It is noted that this con-
vergence occurred in such a way as a result of the ECJ’s core belief of non-discrimination by 
reason of nationality and that “the ECJ speaks the language of freedom and it is committed 
to offering a sound interpretation of the Treaties and facilitating the operation of the internal 
market” (Morano-Foadi & Andreadakis, 2011, p. 1087).
Although there exists a change in how the ECJ rules in cases involving TCNs, it 
should be noted that the interpretation of rights does have a territorial extent in the EU. 
Legal literatures have analyzed that most ECJ cases that have widened and deepened TCN 
rights in the EU only include those who either have relations with an EU citizen or those 
who are EU nationals residing in a different EU member state—EU TCNs. In fact, Slot 
and Bulterman (2006: 749) note, “For third country nationals for whom the rules applicable 
to EU citizens do not apply because they have no relationship with an EU citizen, the 
rules for harmonization have yet to be developed.” According to Kochenov and Plender 
(2012), the ECJ has only recently changed its decision-making method regarding EU TCN 
rights during the 2010 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat of Bayern case (Rottmann), which is now 
characterized as “a new non-market rights-based paradigm of EU citizenship law” (p. 371). 
However, even before Rottmann, the ECJ has had experience in interpreting cases where 
notions of rights and EU citizenship are taken into consideration. For instance, in the 1998 
María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern case (Sala), the ECJ ruled favorably with regard to the 
issue of the degree to which an economically inactive person—in this case, a Spanish citi-
zen who resided in another EU member state—could claim social assistance in an EU host 
member state vis-à-vis the notion of non-discrimination under Article 18 of the EC Treaty. 
The ECJ also favorably considered and, as a matter of fact, extended that particular notion 
of non-discrimination when judging on similar, Sala-like cases like the 2001 Rudy Grzelczyk 
v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve case and the 2002 Baumbast and R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department case. These two cases both deal with not only the 
issue of providing assistance to EU citizens who are viewed as economically inactive by the 
EU host member state that those citizens reside in, but also the issue of those citizens’ right 
to reside in their respective host member states.
Questions of residence and non-discrimination were also asked and positively re-
sponded in cases involving non-EU TCNs who have relations with one or more EU citi-
zens. Two often-cited cases of this instance are the 2004 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man 
Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department case (Chen) and the 2011 Gerardo 
Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi case (Zambrano). The first case involves Kunqian 
Catherine Zhu—a girl born to Chinese parents who were granted Irish nationality due to 
the fact that she was born in Northern Ireland, and hence, were granted EU citizenship—
and Man Lavette Chen—Zhu’s mother who admittedly planned the birth in Northern 
Ireland in order to take advantage of Zhu’s EU citizenship and reside permanently in the 
UK. UK officials rejected Zhu’s and Chen’s application of residence permit, but ultimately, 
the ECJ ruled in favor of Zhu and Chen, taking into account Chen’s status as a minor, an 
EU citizen, and the notion of non-discrimination under Article 18 of the EC Treaty. The 
second case is similar to that of the first, but it did not involve the exercise of the right of 
free movement and residence by the EU citizen—which would be the children in both 
cases. Instead, in the second case, the ECJ affirmed the right of non-EU TCN parents who 
are primary caregivers of minors who are EU citizens to reside and work in the EU member 
Constructing Fortress Europe: Third Country Nationals As Unwelcom
3 4 
state that granted citizenship to the children.
Zambrano constitutes one major TCN case after Rottman that interpreted citizenship 
and the provision of rights differently. Peh (2013) notes that the Rottman judgment “sig-
nalled a willingness to depart from [the ECJ’s] earlier cross-border approach” (p. 34) in 
interpreting EU provisions regarding EU TCNs. Although pre-Rottmann cases did broaden 
the scope of rights entitlement of certain TCNs, Kochenov and Plender (2012) note that 
those cases applied a “purely market-oriented cross-border logic” (p. 376) that took into 
account the EU’s economic core of the establishment of a single market and the four free-
doms that are attached to it. Legal literatures note that post Rottmann cases, including Zam-
brano, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, and Dereci and others v. 
Bundesministerium für Inneres illustrate that not only has the ECJ changed its decision-making 
method regarding TCN related cases, but it has also expanded, to an extent, the notion of 
EU citizenship vis-à-vis non-discrimination and the rights that come with it as something 
other than just the involvement in the EU’s internal market by way of exercising the four 
freedoms afforded by being a citizen of the EU (Kochenov, 2011; Kochenov & Plender, 
2012; Peh, 2013; Shuibhne, 2012).
Even though there still exists an extent to who could benefit from the rights given by 
the EU and its member states, as well as the forms of rights that could be conferred to non-
EU and EU TCNs (Kochenov, 2009), it is imperative to note the impact that the expansion 
of certain TCN rights has had over time to EU member states. The widening and deepening 
of TCN rights, though mainly pertain to EU TCNs and non-EU TCNs who have relations 
with an EU citizen, in the EU level over time might seem as something completely posi-
tive, it does present a threat to the notions of citizenship in Europe. As has been discussed, a 
blurred line exists in Europe with regard to the definition of citizenship and its implications. 
The creation of EU citizenship under Articles 8-8e of Maastricht has challenged not only 
the supremacy of individual national member state citizenship, but also “the paradigmatic 
understanding of citizenship as congruence between nation, state and membership rights” 
(Olsen, 2013, p. 505). Therefore, the understanding of citizenship in the national level and 
in the supranational EU level clashes with each other, simply because of the difference in 
their scope of polity and community. Not only that, but the three aspects of citizenship—
citizenship as status, citizenship as rights, and citizenship as identity—are also put to conten-
tion as EU citizenship blurred the line between nationals and foreigners (Joppke, 2007b). 
According to Joppke (2007b), citizenship as status is defined as the “formal state membership 
and the rules of access to it” (p. 38), whilst citizenship as rights is defined as the “formal 
capacities and immunities connected with such status,” and citizenship as identity is defined 
as the “behavioral aspects of individuals acting and conceiving of themselves as members of a 
collectivity, classically the nation, or the normative conceptions of such behavior imputed by 
the state.” As was discussed in previous paragraphs, the expansion of rights for certain TCNs 
presents a crux in Europe, since even though the status of EU citizenship is conferred upon 
all nationals of EU member states, the increase in the provision of EU and certain non-EU 
TCN rights by the TCN’s respective EU host member state—resulting from those states’ 
obligation to conform to any ECJ judgments and to any EU provisions regarding non-EU 
and EU TCNs—has challenged the national identity of each individual EU member states.
With regard to the role of EU citizenship, Amsterdam notes, “Citizenship of the 
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship” (as cited in Kochenov, 2009, 
p. 181). With this in mind, literatures on citizenship in Europe that characterize citizenship 
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as being, inter alia, postnational, transitional, and nested need to be questioned. Although, 
as has been discussed in the literature review, these three concepts are different in their own 
way, they do have a commonality—that is, their recognition of EU citizenship as taking 
precedence over national member state citizenship. With regard to this issue, Hansen (2009) 
argues,
EU citizenship in no way challenges national citizenship. This fact is clear from 
the treaties, yet scholars continue to imbue EU citizenship with an empirical con-
tent and theoretical importance that it simply lacks. … [T]he European Union 
has almost nothing to do with immigration and citizenship. (p. 6)
With this in mind, it is not surprising then that contestations inside individual EU member 
states could arise when non-EU TCNs who have no relationships to any EU citizens are put 
into Europe’s citizenship equation. As a result of the expansion of rights of certain TCNs 
through the regulations and rulings of the ECJ, it can be argued that both non-EU and 
EU TCNs are breaking the boundary of Europe’s two-level citizenship. The provision of 
rights might be seen as a prelude to the provision of citizenship, since, as was noted, rights 
constitute as one of three aspects of citizenship (Joppke, 2007b). For TCNs who are in the 
EU or who are entering the borders of Europe, there still exist limitations to what rights 
they could have or claim, simply as a result of their status as a non-EU citizen. However, as 
was previously explained, the fact that certain TCN rights have expanded throughout the 
course of EU history—even if this expansion only pertains to TCNs who have relations to 
an EU citizen or are nationals of an EU member state, but reside in a different EU member 
state—should still be noted, for its expansion could constitute as a threat to the definition 
of citizenship as identity.
Guild (2014) opines, “The European Union is currently suffering a minor identity 
crisis. … The problem is that some member states are no longer sure that all EU citizens 
should be treated equally … while others are outraged that their citizens might be treated 
as less equal EU citizens than others” (p. 1). For a citizen to be treated equally entails that 
citizen to have equal amount of rights as others. According to Kaczorowska (2013), “the 
principle of equality means that in the EU all Member States are equal in that they enjoy 
the same privileges and have to fulfill the same obligations vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis 
the EU” (p. 40). The fact that an EU member state national has, as a result of their state’s 
membership to the EU, the same EU level rights, which are governed by the Community 
method, is what makes that national an EU citizen. At the same time, however, that EU 
member state national may identify more with his or her national citizenship, as opposed 
to EU citizenship, since the latter, as stated before, acts as a complement to, rather than a 
replacement for national citizenship. In fact, Eurobarometer (2013) notes 49 % of Europeans 
define themselves first by their nationality and then as an EU citizen, whilst 38 % of Euro-
peans define themselves solely by their nationality (p. 26). For this reason, it can be argued 
that in the case of Europe, EU citizenship concerns more toward the expansion of rights as 
it fosters “the values of belonging, rights and participation” (Bellamy, 2008), yet identity is 
still intact within particular national member states.
When nationals of an EU member state who reside in a different EU member state are 
conceptualized as TCNs—which, therefore, would extend the scope of the EU’s concept 
of TCNs to encompass both non-EU and EU citizens who do not hold national citizenship 
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of their EU host member state—it is apparent that the backlash against immigration might 
be caused more by the fact that EU TCNs and non-EU TCNs who have relations with 
one or more EU citizens are infringing on individual member states’ national identity. By 
virtue of the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy, national member states are liable to 
not only take EU laws and regulations as precedence, but also transposing and implementing 
them in the national level (Eurofound, 2011a, 2011b). Therefore, since the ECJ is arguably 
the highest court in Europe by the fact that it has exclusive jurisdiction, conferred upon 
under Article 267 of the EC Treaty, in interpreting the treaties that govern the EU and any 
secondary EU laws that include those that pertain to non-EU TCNs, judgments made by 
the ECJ constitute a precedent and EU member states “are bound by the operative part of 
the judgment” when ruling on similar cases (Lenz, 1994, p. 403). Therefore, decisions that 
the ECJ made to expand upon the rights of certain TCNs from the EU level, which would 
then require EU member states to oblige to that decision, could be seen as infringing upon 
the notion of citizenship in the national level—specifically that of citizenship as identity. It 
is not unusual then that individual EU member states are seen to construct Fortress Europe 
to prevent non-EU TCNs from coming into the EU’s already untidy identity crisis. A study 
of opinions on immigration by Sides and Citrin (2007) concludes that the strong backlash 
against immigration is rooted in perceptions of cultural and identity threats, which take 
precedence over perceptions over economic threats. Such conclusion is similar to some of 
the claims made in the literature on the securitization of immigration. Both studies charac-
terize non-EU TCNs as not only someone from outside of the EU, but also a threat; or as 
Huysmans (2000) puts it, “an internal and external danger for the survival of the national 
community or western civilization” (p. 758). However, claims that were brought up from 
the literature on the securitization of immigration focused mainly on how Europeanization 
has securitized immigration in the EU level, not on Europe’s multidimensional notions of 
citizenship.
Furthermore, Hansen (1998, 2009) argues that because national member state citizen-
ship takes precedence over EU citizenship, the latter can be viewed as a reinforcing agent 
of the former, since a non-EU TCN has to obtain the former to then obtain the latter. The 
use of civic integration is a pertinent example of this reinforcement. This particular practice 
of integration was and is still used as a result of the failure of multiculturalism in Europe and 
aims to, as Focus Migration (2007) notes, “inculcate the values and principles of liberal de-
mocracy” (p. 1), as well as to acquaint migrants to the history and culture of their host state. 
Joppke and Morawska (2003) further note that in fact, the decay of multiculturalism and the 
subsequent increase of civic integration practices in Europe constitute as a step toward more 
of a logic of assimilation in Europe. However, Jacobs and Rea (2007) argue that although 
there exists a “rapid diffusion of civic integration policies” (p. 276) in Europe, it does not 
mean that multiculturalism has ended in Europe and that a shift toward a logic of assimila-
tion would inevitably take place. Jacobs and Rea (2007) further argue that “the ideology of 
multiculturalism has the rejection of homogenisation and assimilation as its central tenet,” 
which is not in line with civic integration practices since they explicitly specify that “a cer-
tain degree of homogenisation, civic acculturation and (linguistic) assimilation (for a variety 
of reasons)” (p. 277) needs to be achieved.
Even so, a question of where in Europe is civic integration being practiced and diffusing 
rapidly needs to be posed. Joppke (2007a) notes that civic integration was initially created by 
the Dutch not as a national identity issue, but just like the EU, it was created as an economic 
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issue (pp. 5-9). In order for non-EU TCNs in the Netherlands to gain better access to em-
ployment, a certain degree of integration, including a familiarity with the Dutch language 
and the Dutch ways of life, was essential. Joppke further notes that this particular kind of 
integration became an issue of national identity as a result of the increase in populism and 
turmoil surrounding Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands—which might be why a logic 
of assimilation is then taken on. Recent research on civic integration suggested that this type 
of integration could widely be seen exclusively in most Western European states (Carrera, 
2006; Goodman, 2012; Joppke, 2007a, 2007b; Kostakopoulou, 2010). These states include 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Belgium (specifically in the Flanders region), France, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009, pp. 269-270). Interest-
ingly, these states constitute as major EU member states that non-EU TCNs chose to reside 
in (Benton & Petrovic, 2013, p. 3). In all of these nine states, Carrera and Wiesbrock (2009) 
note that there exist differences in the content of their respective civic integration practices, 
with some countries—Finland, Sweden, and the UK—choosing to make civic integration 
optional for most non-EU TCNs. However, Carrerra and Wiesbrock note that all of the 
nine EU member states’ civic integration content contains a language and civic orientation 
requirement. It can be argued that this kind of consensus illustrates the importance of na-
tional identity to individual EU member states. Therefore, the expansion of rights of certain 
TCNs and the fact that both non-EU and EU TCNs are able to freely migrate have created 
a perception of threat to individual EU member states’ identities.
Joppke (2012) further notes that the use and intensity of civic integration vary in 
practice. For instance, Joppke illustrates that in Germany, the acquisition of the German 
language is required as a result of the limited German-speaking pool of immigrants; whilst in 
the UK, civic integration focuses more on British customs and day-to-day living as a result 
of the vast English-speaking pool of immigrants. Furthermore, Cornelissen (2013) notes that 
the ECJ can be seen as beginning to subscribe to the concept of civic integration, which can 
be illustrated in the ECJ’s concurrence in some EU member states’ view that TCNs must 
show a level of integration before claiming any social benefits from their EU host member 
state (p. 106). However, this agreement specifically targets non-EU TCNs who do not have 
any relations to the EU, since, as Ball (2014) notes,
The ECJ’s judgment in Chen and Rottmann negatively resolved any possibility of 
[non-EU] TCNs being able to claim direct national citizenship status through a 
Union route as [non-EU] TCNs cannot fall within the material scope of Union 
citizenship, on the basis that they are not EU citizens. (p. 41)
Therefore, when the issue of identity insecurity that is happening inside the EU is taken 
into consideration, it can be argued that the backlash against immigration might just be 
rooted on contentions within the definition of citizenship in Europe and attached to that, 
the extent to which rights can be conferred upon by a host state to any TCNs, regardless of 
nationality or citizenship. Also, the notion that the Europeanization of immigration com-
petence has securitized immigration should be questioned, since historical path dependent 
policy outcomes and approaches from and of the EU that deal with non-EU TCNs do not 
correspond to the prevalent claims in scholarly literatures on the EU’s construction of For-
tress Europe. To comprehensively understand where and what might explain the backlash 
against immigration in Europe are, therefore, imperative in order to not only understand 
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Europe’s two-level games of Europeanization, but also understand pertinent issue areas 
where unattractive claims regarding immigration and migrants might just be used as a veil to 
cover the dysfunction of having a two-level conceptualization of citizenship.
Conclusion
As inter- and intra-EU immigration continue to occur, a complete construction of 
Fortress Europe might not see the light of day. As this paper has presented, a historical in-
stitutionalist approach to analyzing the development of immigration policies and approaches 
in the EU level has shown that scholarly claims regarding the securitization of immigration 
via the bottom-up Europeanization of immigration competence as being the cause for the 
backlash against immigration can be considered as false. The development of EU immigra-
tion policies and approaches rely on the institutionalist notion of path dependency, pointing 
specifically to the roles of past policy decisions and the impact that those decisions have 
on the current state of EU immigration texts. In fact, a recent communication given by 
the European Commission (2014a) regarding the future of EU Home Affairs policies only 
touches upon furthering the transposition and implementation of the Common European 
and Asylum System, which encompasses, inter alia, the already established Dublin III. Other 
than that, the Commission only reiterates existing and already proposed EU policies and 
approaches to immigration control without suggesting much concrete action other than 
transposing and implementing them correctly.
If, however, a sole focus on ideational notions of citizenship in Europe is considered, 
then it is apparent that the crux of the backlash against immigration in Europe lies in the 
EU’s identity crisis. As the ECJ began to change its decision-making method regarding 
TCN related cases and the fact that non-EU and EU TCNs can now attain more rights than 
before in an EU host member state, the notion of citizenship as identity in Europe has be-
come hazy. This obscure line between nationals and foreigners that is happening inside the 
EU can be argued as the prime reason for the construction of Fortress Europe. Therefore, 
the admittance of non-EU TCNs has become tougher, especially in migrant-receiving states 
of Western Europe, in which the practice of civic integration has become a key condition 
to enter their internal border. Moving forward, it is imperative to further research on Euro-
pean immigration in terms of each individual member states’ policies and approaches, rather 
than the EU as a whole so as to account for all of the nuances that those states have with 
regard to the impact of admitting TCNs, regardless of nationality or citizenship, would have 
caused on their ideational notion of citizenship as identity. This way, a better, or rather a 
much more novel understanding of the Fortress Europe phenomenon can be achieved—an 
understanding that focuses more on how Europe’s multidimensional notion of citizenship 
impacts contemporary intra- and inter-EU immigration.
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